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Among the more encouraging developments of  the last twelve months has been the renewed 
interest in the “Green New Deal”, at first among leftists in the United States (US), especially 
recently elected Congresswoman Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez,2 but also, in reaction to this, in 
Europe. The idea had already been discussed in the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany over 
ten years ago (Green New Deal Group, 2008; Giegold and Bütikofer, 2009), but seemed to have 
been dropped due to a lack of  resonance, or because some early protagonists changed their 
minds. The very term “Green New Deal” harkens back to what is sometimes called capitalism’s 
Golden Age – that is, to an age of  Keynesian class compromise that was arguably better for large 
sections of  the working class, although not for its more marginal segments, like female or migrant 
workers. At the same time, it promises to address the challenges of  the present, namely the 
climate and environmental crises as well as the social crisis of  increasing inequality and 
precariousness. 
The Green New Deal is not the only expression of  a growing realisation that the climate 
crisis cannot be solved without taking into account the social impact of  the necessary measures. 
In Europe, an important catalyst for this conclusion was the French “yellow vests” movement, a 
short-lived and politically ambivalent, but energetic, popular movement against growing socio-
economic insecurity that was triggered by a planned rise in fuel taxes. It has given a boost to 
discussions about a “just transition”. 
Around the same time as the yellow vests, another movement began in Europe that has 
shifted the political coordinates: the “School Strikes for Climate” by pupils. Their single demand 
is that governments take effective action to combat catastrophic climate change. In summer 2018, 
sixteen-year-old Swede Greta Thunberg decided to skip school to sit in front of  the Swedish 
parliament building with a hand-made sign with the words Skolstrejk för klimatet (School Strike for 
Climate) until such time as the government takes action to bring Sweden in line with the goals of  
the 2015 Paris Climate Accord. Her example quickly inspired regular school strikes in a number 
of  European countries, notably Belgium and Germany, but also outside Europe. These ongoing 
protests have shaken up the established political parties and are arguably a factor behind the 
strong performance of  Green parties at the elections for the European Parliament in May 2019. 
However, there are also less-encouraging developments. First, there seems to be a growing 
distance, even distrust, between some of  the activists and political actors that are primarily 
focused on environmental goals, especially climate change, on the one hand, and those who base 
themselves in some way on the labour movement on the other. Examples of  the former include 
the German Green party. The most successful of  all the ecologist parties in Europe, and 
 
1 The author is writing in a strictly personal capacity. None of  the following should be in any way taken as 
the stance of  the European Parliament or any of  the political parties represented in it. 
2 Ocasio-Cortez submitted a motion for a Green New Deal to the US House of  Representatives, though, 
unsurprisingly, without success (https://ocasio-cortez.house.gov/gnd; accessed 22 July 2019). 
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probably the entire world, it used to be firmly rooted in a left-wing world view and regularly 
opted for alliances with the centre–left Social Democrats and/or Germany’s left-wing party. In 
recent years, however, it has opened itself  up much more to the centre–right and the parties of  
the traditional bourgeoisie. The most important example of  this trend is found in the south-
western state of  Baden Württemberg, the first ever state in the Federal Republic of  Germany to 
have a Green prime minister. After governing together with the Social Democrats from 2011 
until 2016, the Greens entered into a coalition with the centre–right Christian Democrats. Rather 
than a marriage of  convenience dictated by election results, it shows signs of  being a genuine 
match, as evidenced in the cosy relationship between the Green prime minister of  Baden 
Württemberg and the automotive industry, which is traditionally strong in this state.3 Moreover, 
following the German Greens’ strong election results in recent state-level elections, and most 
recently in the elections for the European Parliament in which they came second, they are headed 
for a coalition with the centre–right and the free-market liberal party after the 2021 federal 
elections – something that would have incensed the party base not too long ago, but is seen as 
normal now. 
Then there is the battle over the future of  coal. Energy generation from coal or lignite 
produces high levels of  emissions and is rightly in the cross-hairs of  European climate activists. 
They demand an end to coal and lignite in the very short term to achieve the world’s climate 
goals as set out in the Paris Climate Accord. However, this pits them against workers, trade 
unions and entire regions who are understandably afraid about job losses and socio-economic 
decline. 
There is thus a risk of  a permanent disconnect between the red and the green, even though 
none of  the actors involved may actively work towards that. Such a disconnect corresponds to 
realistic strategic options. It is entirely possible to create social and political alliances that 
foreground either redistribution and jobs or, alternatively, the fight against climate change and 
other forms of  environmental degradation. Such alliances seem easier to forge than one that tries 
to unite both in a coherent project. However, as I will argue here, focusing on either the red or 
the green comes at a high risk of  achieving neither. Progressives should choose the more difficult 
route of  bringing the two together. 
The following thoughts about the compatibility of  “red” and “green” policies and the social 
alliances underpinning the different strategic options necessarily use a very broad brush. They 
describe tendencies that are certainly real, but far from uniform across countries and continents. 
They are to varying degrees characteristic of  highly developed capitalist countries in north-
western Europe and North America. Other parts of  the world have rather different dynamics. 
 
 
Socio-economic Discontent among Popular Classes as a Threat to 
Socially Imbalanced Environmentalism 
What lessons does the French yellow vest movement hold for a red-and-green politics? In a 
nutshell, it has demonstrated what can happen when eco-taxes on consumption hit economically 
struggling sections of  a population. This highly decentralised protest movement emerged late in 
2018 and lasted less than half  a year. During this time, however, it managed to organise 
 
3 On the intellectual side, this tendency is represented by Ralf  Fücks who has been promoting a green 
market economy and has referred to himself  as a “green ordo-liberal” – ordo-liberalism being a kind of  
domestic German equivalent to the neo-liberal views that dominate the Anglo-American world 
(Poschardt, 2013).  
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numerous, occasionally militant protests in the capital, Paris, as well as in many other places all 
around the country. In fact, the movement has strong roots outside of  Paris, France’s undisputed 
centre for everything. One of  its most popular tactics was to blockade traffic roundabouts to 
draw attention to itself  and its demands. Copy-cat initiatives quickly emerged in other European 
countries, but never reached significant size or power, with the possible exception of  Belgium. 
The movement was triggered by a government plan to raise the taxes on fuel for cars as a means 
of  financing and implementing an energy transition, but it was driven by a broad, albeit diffuse, 
socio-economic discontent. As a consequence of  the yellow vests’ determined protests, the 
French government scrapped the planned increase of  the fuel tax for 2019 and announced 
further measures to reduce the tax burden for people on low incomes. 
Politically, the yellow vests were hard to pin down, especially along the traditional left–right 
spectrum. According to a survey by the sociological research group Quantité Critique among 
activists and sympathisers of  the yellow vest movement, 51 per cent declared themselves to be 
neither left nor right, while another 19 per cent refused to answer the question. Of  the remaining 
30 per cent, about half  considered themselves left-wing or very left-wing, 11.6 per cent right-
wing or very right-wing, and the remainder stood in the middle. When asked whom they had 
supported in the French 2017 presidential elections, none of  the candidates that had been 
available, nor any of  the political camps more broadly speaking, emerged as a clear frontrunner. 
However, it is interesting that the two who garnered most votes from among the surveyed yellow 
vests were the radical right candidate Marine Le Pen (19 per cent) and the left-wing candidate 
Jean-Luc Mélenchon (18.4 per cent) (Quantité Critique, 2018). 
Despite the movement’s lack of  a clear political tendency, its demands appear to have a left-
wing slant, although its decentralised nature makes it difficult to say what its “official” demands 
are.4 They partly reflect the fact that it originated as a movement against a specific tax rise, so 
demands for tax justice feature largely. These were later supplemented by demands for more 
direct democracy and for wealth redistribution through the government (Bendaly and Kabbaj, 
2019: 9). About two-thirds of  the yellow vests come from the popular classes composed of  
workers, non-senior employees and small business owners or craftsmen. Over 60 per cent claim 
that they regularly experience financial difficulties at the end of  each month (Bendaly and 
Kabbaj, 2019: 3). Considering the politically diffuse, albeit generally redistributive, nature of  the 
movement and its demands, the absence of  organisation or recognised leaders, and its social 
composition, it seems fair to characterise the yellow vest movement as one of  the popular tax 
revolts, of  which history knows many. 
The movement and its success in defeating the fuel tax increase demonstrate what can 
happen when socially unbalanced environmentalism meets increasing social inequality. Any 
transition to a low-carbon and ecologically sustainable economy entails considerable burdens of  
adjustment in terms of  job losses in certain industries like fossil fuel extraction, increases in 
public expenditure, devaluation of  privately owned investments in industries made unviable by 
environmental regulation (so-called stranded assets), and higher costs for certain goods and 
services for consumers, especially those with a high carbon footprint, such as air travel. As a 
tendency, the more unequal a society is, the more difficult it will be for that society to distribute 
 
4 See also “Gilets Jaunes: A Pioneering Study of  the ‘Low Earners’ Revolt’, Verso Blog (14 December 
2018), available at www.versobooks.com/blogs/4180-gilets-jaunes-a-pioneering-study-of-the-low-earners-
revolt (accessed 6 September 2019); originally published as “Gilets jaunes: une enquête pionnière sur la 
‘révolte des revenus modestes’”, Le Monde (11 December 2018), available at 
www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2018/12/11/gilets-jaunes-une-enquete-pionniere-sur-la-revolte-des-
revenus-modestes_5395562_3232.html (accessed 6 September 2019). 
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these burdens in politically acceptable fashion (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009: 215–228, 2014).5 
More egalitarian societies can reach agreement more easily because of  a stronger sense that 
everybody will have to shoulder their fair share of  the burden and that no one will be left behind 
by the transition. Once above a certain threshold of  material wealth, individuals are no longer 
interested primarily in their absolute level of  wealth, but more in their social position relative to 
their peers as well as their perspectives for the future. This implies that, in the highly developed 
countries, there would even be some scope for wealth losses in absolute terms for a considerable 
part of  the population. On the other hand, in highly unequal societies struggles over who bears 
the burden of  adjustment will be fiercer because each group will fear being put at a disadvantage. 
Those whose socio-economic position is already precarious would suffer particularly, be it 
because of  job losses, the decline of  entire regions, or because they are disproportionately 
affected by taxes on consumption that make sense from an environmental perspective but that, 
like all consumption taxes, are regressive. The yellow vests are a case in point. Having been 
squeezed financially for a while as a result of  changes to the welfare state and more regressive 
taxation, they had finally had enough when the planned fuel tax threatened to further deteriorate 
their already precarious socio-economic situation (Özpınar, 2019). 
Interestingly, however, although the yellow vest movement was triggered by the introduction 
of  a fuel tax that was explicitly intended by President Macron as a means of  financing and 
implementing an energy transition, it appears that its activists and sympathisers are not hostile to 
environmental concerns and that many of  them, in fact, share those concerns (Bendali and 
Kabbaj, 2019: 7). That suggests that a political space exists for the introduction of  environmental 
measures, perhaps even those that affect individual consumption, provided that overall tax justice 
is assured and that the trend towards widening inequalities is halted or reversed. The yellow vests 
are not the enemy of  the student climate protesters! 
The yellow vests were a classic street protest movement, but discontent can also be expressed 
at the ballot box. In various countries, working-class voters have recently lent their support to 
politicians or parties of  the very far right. In Germany, for instance, the far-right Alternative for 
Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) has been described as the new workers’ party because 
of  its support from working-class voters, especially trade unionists (Dörre, 2018; Manow, 2018: 
96–99).6 For France, Eribon (2016) has described how many working-class people have turned to 
the party of  Marine Le Pen.7 With the possible exception of  miners, these shifts are not directly 
 
5 The relation between different levels of  inequality and the capacity of  arriving at a mutually agreeable 
distribution of  the burden of  adaptation may not be quite so straightforward. Different societies tolerate – 
in the sense of  an absence of  major political protest and upheaval – different absolute levels of  social 
inequality. It may be the trend towards increasing or decreasing inequality that plays a role. France is 
probably still a comparatively equal society, but the recent tendency was for inequality to increase. 
Conversely, societies with an absolutely higher level of  inequality might also be able to come to a burden-
sharing agreement, provided that the trend is towards a decrease in inequality. 
6 According to figures published by the German trade union federation Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund 
(DGB), 13.1 per cent of  union members who voted in the May 2019 European election voted for the 
AfD, compared to 11.0 per cent of  all German voters (https://www.dgb.de/++co++dd681d04-806e-
11e9-aa1d-52540088cada; accessed 25 July 2019). 
7 Should Donald Trump be included as another example of  a working-class shift to the right? After the 
2016 US presidential election, many argued that Trump won because of  mass defections of  (white) 
workers from the Democratic Party. These claims appear overblown because Trump’s main support base, 
at least during the primaries, consisted of  above-average-earning and above-average-educated people 
(Manza and Crowley, 2017). That said, it seems that a certain part of  the working-class vote did go to 
Trump, notably in states with a high concentration of  manufacturing industries. While small in absolute 
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connected to environmental issues, but they are manifestations of  a growing alienation between 
the working class and the left. Moreover, as a rule, these far-right parties and politicians are either 
clearly against effective climate protection measures and/or the Paris Accord, or at least 
ambivalent about them (Waldholz, 2019). Defections to the political right by sections of  the 
working class could, therefore, have the more or less unintended consequence of  sabotaging 
effective climate protection. Donald Trump, who announced in 2017 that the United States 




The Strategic Options for the Left: Between Red and Green 
In this situation, characterised by an increasingly urgent environmental crisis and increasing 
discontent over rising inequality, what are the strategic options for the left? At the risk of  gross 
over-simplification, and based on the assumption that the two main challenges for progressive 
politics are effective climate protection and the redistribution of  income and wealth, but that 









Yes Popular (or cross-class)  
red-and-green alliance 
Traditional working-class bloc 
No Green–bourgeois bloc ** 




These options present different risks and opportunities, and correspond to different possible 
alliances, both at the level of  party politics and the level of  social classes. They may appear 
mechanically derived by cross-tabulating two binary options, but, as I have argued in the 
introduction, they correspond to political projects suggested or articulated by real people on the 
left.  
One risk factor to take into account is which actors and social classes are most likely to 
oppose ambitious climate protection policies. One advantage that the “green–bourgeois” option 
has over the “red-and-green alliance” option is that it would not have to deal with the thorny 
political issue of  how to compensate coal-mining regions, and possibly auto-industry regions, for 
the consequences of  shutting them down or reducing them considerably. However, it would be 
confronted with two serious problems. First, since it relies on an alliance between the new green 
and highly educated urban bourgeoisie on the one hand and the traditional moneyed bourgeoisie 
on the other, the green–bourgeois alliance would have to consider the economic interests of  the 
traditional bourgeoisie. These interests will be a formidable obstacle to effective climate 
 
numbers, these defections seem to have been crucial in securing Trump’s overall victory (Brownstein, 
2016). 
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protection. This is not because capitalists would simply block all such measures, but because they 
would water them down to the point that they become ineffective, or not as effective as they 
would have to be to achieve the rapid transition that is necessary to keep global warming to a 
tolerable level. Even relatively non-threatening market-based approaches like the sustainable 
business agenda are met with determined and frequently successful resistance from business 
lobbyists and the parties that sympathise with them. In more structural terms: effective climate 
protection measures in the context of  a green–bourgeois scenario would clash with capital in 
general because, save for a few industries like solar panel producers, business will see these 
measures as excessively burdensome. 
The second problem has already been mentioned. Parts of  the working and middle classes, 
especially those who fear a loss of  social status or are already feeling the effects of  precarious 
work, may defect to the right and vote people into political power who are not committed to 
environmental protection because they believe that these people will listen to their concerns. Or, 
as in the case of  the yellow vests, grass-roots movements of  the economically disadvantaged may 
derail environmental policies that put the burden disproportionately on them, as in the case of  
carbon taxes for consumer goods and services. The motives of  voters or protesters may be 
primarily economic, but they would also pose a risk to the success of  environmental policies. 
Consumption taxes that are environmentally useful, but inevitably regressive, are an instrument 
that a green–bourgeois alliance would probably use extensively because they would not reduce 
the profits on capital, nor make a significant dent in the bourgeoisie’s wealth. In short, in the 
green–bourgeois alliance scenario, the risk is that working-class people and others in precarious 
socio-economic conditions would derail the alliance’s environmental policies, which would be 
unambitious anyway, either directly or through the ballot box. 
Effective climate protection measures in the “red-and-green” alliance scenario would lead to 
a clash with workers in highly polluting industries, but not with the working class in general. It 
would, however, lead to fierce battle with business interests in general, save perhaps for a few 
industries that would stand to gain so much from an ecological transformation that vastly 
increased revenues would compensate them for higher taxes and wages. The following section 
looks at this scenario in a little more depth. 
Table 2 summarises the main points so far and tries to flesh out the risks and opportunities 
for each of  the three strategic options, especially the “traditional working-class bloc” scenario, 
which will not be discussed separately. It also identifies the alliances that could support each 
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Table 2. Consequences of  the left’s strategic options between the red and the green 







Attempt to recreate historic 
popular alliance between 
people with low to average 
incomes who are at risk of  a 
loss of  social status and 
progressive urban milieux. At 
party-political level, this would 
amount to “red-red-green” 
coalitions of  social democrats, 
left-wing parties and greens, 
and, in some countries, 
possibly liberal parties, such as 
the Dutch D66.8 
Green bourgeoisie, i.e. educated 
urban middle class, together with the 
more progressive sections of  the 
traditional bourgeoisie and “green” 
branches of  industry. At party-
political level, this alliance could be 
represented by coalitions that involve 
the green and liberal parties and 
either a very centrist centre–left or a 
moderate centre–right party. 
Targets the working class, 
especially its male part, and 
sections of  the lower middle 
class, especially those who are 
at risk of  losing social status. 
At the party-political level this 
would be reflected in alliances 
between centre–left and more 
radical left-wing parties, or, in 
countries like the UK, a 
reinvigorated Labour Party 
under left-wing leadership. 
Opportunities A broad-based progressive 
project for socio-economic 
transformation offers the best 
chances for effective climate 
protection because the burdens 
of  adjustments can be 
distributed in more consensual 
fashion. 
In some European countries, such as 
Germany, this seems currently the 
most likely and easily achieved 
alliance because many green voters 
have themselves become relatively 
bourgeois in terms of  class habitus, 
and because the parties of  the new, 
green and the traditional bourgeoisie 
have also become closer lately. It 
offers the best chance to achieve 
moderate climate-related goals in the 
medium term. 
Easy to demarcate political 
friends and foe, and thus 
amenable to populist/popular 
politics (Nölke, 2017; Mouffe, 
2018), which facilitates 
campaigning and mobilisation. 
Likely to be most effective in 
regaining some working-class 
and protest voters who have 
turned to the right. 
Risks Relatively difficult to come up 
with clear messages and to 
mobilise because of  
considerable socio-cultural 
cleavages between the social 
groups that would have to 
support this option. Capital 
flight and tax resistance on the 
part of  the rich and large 
corporations. Risk that the 
alliance will falter over conflict 
between environmental goals 
and securing jobs in highly 
polluting industries. 
Would amount to giving up on the 
long-term perspective of  creating a 
progressive social majority and a 
progressive project combining red 
and green objectives. Maintaining the 
green–bourgeois bloc would also 
mean curtailing the ambitiousness of  
climate protection. Severe risk that 
the bottom half  of  society is lost 
forever for progressive politics to 
radical right or even fascist political 
actors. In the best case, the green–
bourgeois bloc would encounter stiff, 
but politically diffuse resistance like 
France’s yellow vests. 
The somewhat retrograde and 
fairly narrow social base that 
would back this strategic 
option means that it would 
struggle to attain a social and 
party-political majority. High 
risk that progressive urban 
social milieux will be driven 
into the arms of  the traditional 
bourgeoisie. High risk of  being 
ineffective in socio-economic 
and environmental terms. Risk 
of  capital flight. 
 
 
Prospects for a Red-and-Green Alliance 
How likely is the creation of  a cross-class red-and-green alliance? It is in some ways the most 
difficult because the classes and social groups to be brought together are far apart in terms of  
their life worlds, and there is a chance that they would clash over certain progressive values like 
openness towards migration, LGBT rights and so on – those that have been called, somewhat 
misleadingly, “identity politics”. Moreover, inasmuch as such an alliance amounts to an attempt to 
 
8 In first-past-the-post or majoritarian electoral systems, like that of  the UK, the party-political 
representation of  this particular societal alliance would have to be very different. It might require the 
traditional centre–left party to become more radical and acquire an environmentalist agenda. 
 
Global Labour Journal, 2019, 10(3), Page 247 
 
make the bourgeoisie and business bear a large part of  the burden of  adjustment that comes with 
the transition to an ecologically sustainable economy, it would make very powerful enemies and 
face relentless media scaremongering about an impending “communist takeover” as well as a 
severe and concerted pushback by the affected social groups, including threats of  and actual 
capital flight. It might also have to deal with some measure of  resistance from workers and 
unions in polluting industries, although the strength of  that resistance is likely to diminish if  
credible assurances are put in place that they will not be left behind by the transformation. 
On the other hand, the Green New Deal provides the cross-class red-and-green alliance with 
a narrative and a comprehensive, viable project that unites the two sides. Furthermore, despite 
the dominant tendency of  estrangement between environmentalists and class warriors, there are 
also tentative developments in the opposite direction among, for example, European trade 
unions. Some German unions – such as the services workers’ union Ver.di, the metal workers’ 
union IG Metall, which is strong in the automotive sector, and the construction workers’ union 
IG BAU – have started to address ecological concerns and are now actively debating how to 
shape the transition to a low-carbon economy (Bergfeld, 2019). IG Metall even accepted a recent 
invitation for a high-level exchange of  views from the School Strikes for Climate movement, and 
IG BAU encouraged its members to participate in a day of  global climate strike action on 20 
September 2019. British unions are also engaging more and more with environmental concerns 
(Farnhill, 2016), and the University and College Union (UCU) called for a thirty-minute solidarity 
stoppage in support of  the global climate strike (UCU, 2019).  
That said, these initiatives and discussions remain half-hearted or within a framework of  
ecological modernisation, and do not contemplate more radical steps, such as the overall 
reduction of  consumption levels or a break with certain types of  infrastructure or consumption 
norms, like the prevalence of  individual auto-mobility (Brand, 2019). Too few are as committed 
to bringing together environmental protection and the struggle for better working and living 
conditions as the National Union of  Metalworkers of  South Africa, which has in recent years 
systematically built up organisational capacities and internal knowledge about environmental 
concerns (Satgar, 2015). Perhaps unions should consider taking up again the old demand of  a 
drastic reduction of  working hours. Ultimately, they would have to rise above a corporatist 
defence of  their members’ immediate economic interests and position themselves as actors of  an 
environmental transition. Left-wing parties should support such moves and represent them in 
institutional politics. 
As for the Greens, there is, on the one hand, the seemingly inexorable tendency to forge 
alliances with liberals and the centre–right. On the other hand, the discussions over the Green 
New Deal and just transitions have also very clearly struck a chord with them and given a boost 
to more left-leaning sections of  the Greens. They should elevate this rhetoric to a strategic choice 
and draw the inevitable conclusion that alliances with the centre–right and (most) liberal parties 
are not compatible with this strategy. Where their activism puts them into conflict with workers 
in certain industries, environmentalists should also call for forms of  social compensation when 
these industries are shut down or shrunk. Obviously, the traditional parties of  the left also need 
to open themselves up more to environmental issues and, in particular, acknowledge the urgency 
of  fighting climate change. Fortunately, there are positive signs, such as the fact that sections of  
the Democratic Party in the United States actively promote the Green New Deal and that there 
are similar initiatives in the UK Labour Party. 
Mouffe (2018) argues that the current conjuncture is marked by the end of  the hegemony of  
the neo-liberal project and the social forces associated with it, and therefore represents a moment 
of  genuine political openness. That openness is currently exploited more effectively by the 
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political right, but if  progressive forces play their cards right and build on the above-mentioned 
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